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Lawyers for Conservative Causes
Our functional definition, thus, does not require that the lawyers view themselves as "conservative cause lawyers."5 A majority of the lawyers considered here would probably accept that label, but some would not. In interviews, some lawyers for business organizations describe themselves as political moderates, pragmatists who can work across party lines. Several libertarian lawyers told us that the term "conservative" implies sympathy with the social conservative agenda, which they adamantly reject, and several lawyers who work on pro-life and religious liberty issues claim to be working in the liberal activist tradition, seeking to extend protections and liberties to citizens not served by the ACLU or the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund. Many of the questions just posed assume that the several elements of the conservative movement will want to work together because broader support for their positions will be advantageous.
5 Some have questioned whether lawyers for conservative causes really are "cause lawyers" in the sense in which that term is used to describe left activists. See, e.g., MenkelMeadow (1998:34) and Sarat and Scheingold (1998:25) . But if cause lawyer is defined to include lawyers who advocate broad redistribution of political, social, economic, and legal resources (see, e.g., Sarat & Scheingold 2001:13), many lawyers for conservative causes would certainly qualify because they challenge prevailing allocations of those assets. Pro-life advocates, for example, seek to reallocate legal protection from pregnant women to unborn children, and lawyers for some religious groups advocate giving religion a larger role vis-a-vis secular values in the public sphere. Groups that support the "defense of marriage" seek to redistribute political and legal legitimacy away from "civil unions" for gay couples. Advocates of tort reform assert that they are trying to restore balance to a system that has been hijacked by personal injury lawyers and runaway juries to the detriment of business and consumers. Property rights advocates argue in favor of transferring power from government regulators to landowners and entrepreneurs. Lawyers for groups that oppose affirmative action challenge employment and educational admission processes that they assert systematically disadvantage their clients. If the term "cause lawyer" includes all those who engage in law-related activity to achieve greater social justice (see, e.g., Menkel-Meadow 1998:37), the question is how "social justice" is to be defined. Definitions that insist on financial sacrifice and ideological commitment also would include many lawyers for conservative causes. Lawyers for religious, patriotic, and libertarian groups may be motivated more by commitment to ideals than by financial gain. The extent to which these lawyers are ideologically committed to their clients' causes is an issue explored in interviews with these lawyers. See note 9.
But this is not necessarily the case. Interest groups make choices as to whether they will or will not cooperate with other groups in pursuing policy goals (Salisbury et al. 1987; Hojnacki 1997 ). Alliances may be costly. Apart from the transaction costs involved in putting together the coalition (and those costs may be substantial), there may also be the cost of modifying one's position in order to satisfy the needs or demands of potential partners, and costs associated with the sharing of credit for one's accomplishments or the loss of the distinctiveness of one's position. Interest groups, like other enterprises, need product differentiation. If the American Family Association has the same policy agenda as the Family Research Council, then the two may find themselves competing for members and, perhaps, for financial support. There are, therefore, reasons why interest groups may prefer to work alone. Unless the potential partner will bring to the joint enterprise new resources that have substantial value-votes, money, media contacts, the appearance of consensus-the costs may well outweigh the gains. Thus, if organization A has the same constituency as organization B, in Congress or among the public, an alliance may be unlikely because no new votes will be gained. But if their constituencies are entirely dissimilar, then an alliance will also be unlikely because it will be difficult for them to find common ground. Alliances may be more profitable, then, where the constituencies of the interest groups have some affinity but are not identical.
Situational variables will also affect the probability of alliances. For example, if the public has closed ranks behind a president during a time of war, an effort to form a coalition to oppose the development of a new weapons system, e.g., the atomic bomb or the Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars), would be likely to die aborning and, therefore, the effort would probably not be made. Since interest group alliances are goal-directed and not, for the most part, entirely irrational, the likelihood of their formation is related to the probability of their success at the particular time and place. The nature of the organizational bases of the groups may also affect the decision to pursue a joint venture. "Grassroots" organizations (i.e., those with a broad public membership) are probably more unwieldy, on the whole, than are groups composed of elites "inside the Beltway." It may well be easier to mobilize a limited set of elites in support of a new initiative than to persuade a broad membership to adopt a new cause and, in the latter case, to persuade policymakers that the membership has, in fact, adopted it. Groups that are principally defined by their message (e.g., "family values," "right to life") may be more difficult to redirect than those that are devoted to advancing the interests of a particular industry or set of companies (e.g., the National Association of Manufacturers or the Business Roundtable). Thus, "expressive groups" (Salisbury 1969 :19) may be less likely to join coalitions. Elite groups may well seek the support of grassroots organizations in order to create the appearance of broader public support, but broad support is not always the preferred strategy. Some groups find that they maximize success by confining their activity to narrow "issue niches" (Browne 1990 ) and, depending upon the issue, many groups may prefer to conduct their lobbying without much public attention. Broader public engagement could then be counterproductive.
Alliances among groups may be continuing working relationships of long standing, or, they may be ad hoc, formed for a particular election or a particular legislative battle. An example of the latter is the Product Liability Coordinating Committee, an alliance of business interests created in the late 1980s to pursue legislation limiting product liability lawsuits. These short-term "umbrella" groups can be distinguished from continuing "peak" organizations-those that represent a broad set of the interests within their policy domains and attempt to pull those interests together (e.g., the AFL-CIO and, perhaps, the Heritage Foundation) (Salisbury et al. 1987 ). Salisbury and his colleagues observe that the prominence of peak organizations is associated with greater polarization of group conflict within the policy area (1987:1229), but the direction of causation is unclear. It may be that the peak associations serve to focus the conflict. That is, by seeking to speak for "labor" or for "business," broadly defined, they frame the issues in ways that guarantee that the conflict between labor and business will be clear and sharp. But it may also be that peak associations are more likely to emerge in policy areas that are already characterized by polarized conflict-and that is why the groups are able to coalesce around poles or peaks. These could well be mutually reinforcing processes, of course.
Another variable that will affect the probability of coalition formation is the presence or absence of trust. Alliances commonly call for some form of exchange, some version of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours." Often, the support of organization A for organization B's initiative at time 1 is conditioned on the support of B for A's goal at time 2. Where the two initiatives do not proceed simultaneously, A must trust B to deliver on the promise of future support. Such trust might be based on a history of satisfactory prior dealings and the expectation of future interactions (Axelrod 1984) or it might be based on reputation. Because social networks provide timely and credible reputational information, and because punishment for violations of trust can be more effectively enforced within a bounded community (Granovetter 1985; Coleman 1990 ), geographic proximity may be of some importance in establishing the basis for trust. Cultural or ethnic homogeneity may also serve to enhance the perception that potential partners share common understandings, belong to the same community, and thus can trust one another (Portes & Sensenbrenner 1993) . Conversely, social dissimilarity will diminish the basis for trust.
Lawyers may be useful links among these groups, then, in part because lawyers are all members of the same profession, they have had similar educational experiences (perhaps at a limited set of schools), and they share a common professional language and a common set of understandings about the legitimate processes of government. Professional reputation and mutual respect among professional brethren may be a basis for trust. Lawyers might, therefore, play an integrative role, serving as communication links among the various elements of the conservative movement and helping to forge those elements together.
I. The Research Design
We defined the set of organizations and lawyers to be studied by selecting 17 "issue events"-legislative events involving issues that were important to various conservative constituencies during the period from 1995-1998.6 These issues (listed in Appendix A) include proposals regarding partial birth abortion, affirmative action in federal programs, school prayer, product liability lawsuits, Superfund legislation, same sex marriage, flag desecration, funding for the National Endowment for the Arts, the minimum wage, compulsory union dues, property rights under the Endangered Species Act, gun locks, a provision of the 1995 crime bill regarding the use of illegally obtained evidence, securities class actions, Bill Lann Lee's nomination to become Assistant Attorney General, funding for the Legal Services Corporation, and a proposal to make English the official language of the federal government. We then searched online archives for articles about these legislative controversies in 18 newspapers and magazines (listed in Appendix B), including major national newspapers, a few regional newspapers, and several prominent conservative journals. We identified all nongovernmental, nonprofit organizations that appeared in these articles on the conservative side of the issues. This method produced the names of 81 organizations. For each of these organizations, we gathered data about the organization's income, foundation funding, board of directors, and lawyers.
The organizations identified include many of the best-known national conservative nonprofit organizations. The list includes the American Conservative Union, the Christian Coalition, Phyllis 6 A crucial issue in the study of political networks is the delineation of system boundaries (Laumann, Marsden, & Prensky 1983; Knoke 1994 This method is, perhaps, more likely to identify organizations active in legislative and administrative work than those focusing primarily on litigation, but many of the most prominent conservative organizations engaged in litigation do appear on our list. The method may also tend to select organizations that seek publicity for their work and undercount organizations that seek to influence law and public policy without drawing media attention. Nonetheless, we think that the "issue-event" approach to identifying the relevant set of organizations is preferable to using preconceived, unsystematic notions of the proper boundaries (whether the notions are ours or those of others).8 7 The Wall Street Journal reported:
The American Medical Association became steeped in politics this week when it surprisingly endorsed the ban; there are credible reports the doctors' lobby secretly struck a deal with GOP leaders over Medicare reimbursement in return for the endorsement ... (Hunt 1997 by an analysis of the patterns of activation of the 81 organizations on the 17 issue events, but the categories were not derived systematically. Thus, these are nominal categories, and one of our objectives should be to assess the similarities and differences among them. The seven types of organizations are business, religious, and libertarian organizations, organizations concerned with abortion, affirmative action, and "order maintenance" (i.e., organizations concerned with crime and/or with the preservation and nurturing of the established social and cultural order), and "mediators." The associations in this final category tend to have broader issue agendas, spanning several categories, and they say that one of their roles is bridging the various conservative constituencies.10 Six organizations that we could not clearly assign, each of which was appear in one or both of these directories. Most of the remaining one-third are trade associations and religious entities.
9 The interviews focus primarily on lawyers' backgrounds, career histories, present work, and roles in setting strategy for the organizations they serve. abortion issue, and one organization in the category was also active on defense of marriage, but that was the limit of their issues. Five of the seven mediator organizations were active on affirmative action, two were engaged by compulsory union dues, and six other issues commanded the attention of one (but, of course, not always the same one) of the organizations in the category. The effort of the business organizations, however, was not focused on such a small set of targets. The largest share of them (seven of the 22 in the category) worked on the minimum wage, four were involved in each of four other issues-product liability, compulsory union dues, security suits, and Superfund-and one or two devoted effort to five other issues. The religious groups also had a relatively broad agenda. Ten of the 19 in the category were active on defense of marriage, nine were active on the National Endowment for the Arts and an equal number on school prayer, and three other issues also received attention.
Thus, the constituencies of some issues are narrower than others. Seven issues received the attention of only one organizational category, while four-defense of marriage, legal services, minimum wage, and the National Endowment-attracted activity from organizations in four categories, and one, affirmative action, drew some effort from five. Similarly, the interest of some organizational categories was concentrated on a relatively narrow agenda, while that of others was broadly distributed.
The categories also differ in the age of their organizations and in the extent of their resources or revenues. The two newest categories (as measured by median founding year) are also the least prosperous (as measured by median annual revenue)-these are the abortion opponent and affirmative action categories. These data reflect the fact that many of the groups in the order maintenance category, such as the American Legion, the National Rifle Association, the Elks, and the Moose, are individual membership organizations, not established solely for political purposes, and many of the business organizations are trade associations that also have more general purposes and agendas. Many of the newer organizations, by contrast, are single-issue, "expressive" interest groups (Walker 1983; Salisbury & Conklin 1998) . Another difference between the categories is the extent of their use of lawyers. Generally, the business and libertarian organizations use lawyers much more than do the organizations advocating socially conservative interests. Of the lawyers identified in our sample, the mean number affiliated with each organization in the business category is 32, in the affirmative action organizations it is 18, and in the libertarian organizations it is 15. By contrast, the abortion opponent organizations average only 7 lawyers per organization, the religious organizations have 10 each, and the average order maintenance organization has 11. Interestingly, however, the organizations in the mediators category also 
III. Lawyer Characteristics
Do the same kinds of lawyers serve these various types of organizations? To address this question, we tabulated the gender, number of years in the legal profession, type of law school attended, and practice location of each of the lawyers affiliated with one or more of the organizations. In the analysis presented in Table  3 , the characteristics of a lawyer who represented organizations in more than one category will be counted in all of the categories in which those organizations appear. Thus, to the extent that lawyers practice (or serve in other capacities) across organizational categories, differentiation among the categories will be diminished. We can see in Table 3 The variable on which we see the most, and the most pronounced, differences in the characteristics of these lawyers is their educational background-where they went to law school. For purposes of this analysis, we have used categories indicating the prestige of the schools. The "elite" law school category includes the top seven schools in the 2000 U.S. News & World Report rankings. Those schools are, in alphabetical order, Chicago, Columbia, Harvard, Michigan, New York University, Stanford, and Yale. The "prestige" category is the schools ranked from 8th to 20th by U.S. News, the "regional" category includes those ranked 21 to 50, and the "local" schools are those ranked below 50. Of the mediators' lawyers, nearly half had attended one of the seven elite schools, but only 8% of the lawyers for the abortion opponents and 10% of lawyers for the order maintenance organizations had done so. More than half (57%) of the abortion lawyers had gone to a local law school and nearly half (49%) of those affiliated with the order maintenance organizations had done so, while only 13% of the mediators' lawyers went to those schools. Clearly, the credentials of the mediators' lawyers are more elite than those in the other organizational categories: these lawyers went to more prestigious law schools and they have substantially more experience at the bar. As we will see, this probably reflects the standing of the mediator organizations as the "establishment" of the conservative movement. The experience and educational credentials of lawyers for religious groups much more clearly resemble those of the abortion opponents and order maintenance lawyers. Neither business nor libertarian lawyers depart from the overall norm on these two variables.
There are also some significant differences in the location of the lawyers' offices. Lawyers for business organizations tend to be located in the Washington, D.C., area and in other major cities, while lawyers for religious, abortion, and order maintenance groups are more broadly distributed. The mediators, libertarian groups, and affirmative action organizations are less distinctive in this respect.
Broadly, we see that lawyers serving mediator, business, and affirmative action organizations have more of an "Eastern establishment" character, while the religious, abortion, and order maintenance lawyers have more "populist" characteristics. These six categories tend clearly in one direction or the other on this continuum, but the characteristics of lawyers for the libertarian organizations are less clearly defined by social type.
Note that there are no significant differences among the categories in the percentages of male and female lawyers. In all categories, the lawyers are overwhelmingly male, with the percentage of women varying only from a high of 17% and 18% in the business and order maintenance categories to a low of 10% in the mediator and affirmative action categories. Such differences as there are in gender, then, cut across the "establishment" versus "populist" dimension.13 13 We are aware of no comparable studies of lawyers for liberal causes, and therefore we are unable to compare demographic characteristics of these lawyers with those of their counterparts on the left. The most similar research, conducted by the Alliance forJustice in 1983-1984 (Aron 1989), focused on lawyers for (liberal) public interest law organizations rather than the broader category of nonprofit organizations included here. The Aron book does not present data about the gender or educational background of these lawyers, but it does examine the organizations' geographic location and the lawyers' practice experience. It found that public interest law centers were concentrated in the Northeast-62% of the groups surveyed were headquartered there (1989:31). With respect to tenure in the profession, it found that "[a]bout one-fifth were experienced lawyers who had been practicing twelve years or more" and that "more than one-third had been at the bar for five years or less" (1989:36). 
Table4. Five Largest Foundation Funders of Each Organizational Category

IV. Sources of Funding
Using information compiled by the Foundation Grants Index (Foundation Center 2000) for the years 1996-1998, we identified the five largest foundation funders of the organizations in each category. The list is presented in Table 4 .14 Three foundations, Bradley, Scaife, and Olin, appear among the top five funders in three categories-the mediator, libertarian, and affirmative action organizations-and two of these three foundations, Bradley and Olin, also appear in the top five in the business category. The Hume Foundation appears in both the business and the affirmative action categories. Clearly, these foundations were very important sources of financial support for conservative causes, but note that they do not appear among the funders of religious, abortion opponent, or order maintenance organizations. There is no overlap between the funders of those three categories and the benefactors of the other four, and the last two categories receive relatively little foundation support from any source.
In some cases at least, membership dues appear to substitute for outside funding-order maintenance organizations, which had the largest revenues, receive the smallest grants. This difference in funding sources may have implications for the organizations' political posture. Organizations that seek to recruit a broad membership may adopt roles or strategies designed to give them greater public visibility, but foundation-funded organizations may be able to operate as insiders, tending networks, facilitating communication among elites, and doing research, while remaining relatively inconspicuous. The sources of funds, however, do not correspond neatly to the establishment versus populist distinction suggested above. That is, although the mediator organizations (which are the most establishment in character) receive by far the largest foundation grants, the religious organizations (much more populist) are in second place, and grants to the business and affirmative action organizations (where the lawyers have more establishment credentials) receive relatively modest grant amounts. No doubt business organizations do not need (or it is perceived that they do not need) much outside funding because of the resources of their sponsors.
The total amount of foundation funding received by the various categories of organizations displays much the same pattern.'5 The largest amount, by far, went to the mediators, a total of $38,652,341. In second place, with less than a third of that amount, is the libertarian category ($12,859,845). The total then drops again by about half, to $6,980,986 for the religious organizations. The affirmative action and business organizations received $2,386,250 and $1,869,300, respectively, and the abortion opponent and order maintenance organizations brought up the rear at a relatively paltry $100,000 and $60,000, respectively.
V. Lawyer Constituencies
In addition to examining the attributes of these organizations and their lawyers, we analyzed the relationships among the lawyers for these conservative constituencies, using social network analysis to "map" those connections. Lawyers serve these organizations in a variety of roles: some are employed by them full-time, either as counsel or in an executive capacity; some serve on boards of directors or boards of advisors; others work as outside counsel, either on litigation or on other legal matters; some serve them as scholars, or as intellectual consultants; and many lawyers are among the principal organizers of the associations. Although these roles can be quite different, the data analyzed here do not distinguish among them. Moreover, the data do not measure degrees of involvement. Rather, they simply record whether the lawyer was or was not affiliated with each organization.16 The extent of the contact or communication among the lawyers in the various roles might well differ from organization to organization or person to person, but lawyers who work for the same organizations may be thought to share an ideological position or issue agenda. Even this is not necessarily the case, however. Some of the lawyers representing these organizations may have done the work for hire, without an ideological commitment-that is, they may not be "cause lawyers," in the usual sense. This is perhaps more likely if the client was a business association than if the lawyer worked with Americans United for Life or the Cato Institute.'7 Nonetheless, some affinity among the lawyers may be inferred if they work for the same organizations (Breiger 1974; Feld 1981) . We can, then, estimate proximities among the lawyers by analyzing similarities and differences in the sets of organizations they serve. The analysis reported here measures the degree to which the organizational affiliations of each pair of lawyers overlap.
Of the 1,300 lawyers identified as having an affiliation with one or more of these organizations, 1,119 were active in only one, 127 were active in two, and 54 were active in three or more. There were no statistically significant differences among the three activity levels in gender, seniority as a lawyer, or type of law school attended, but we did find differences in the region where their offices were located. Of lawyers active in only one organization, nearly twothirds were located outside of the District of Columbia metropolitan area, while more than half of all lawyers active in three or more organizations were in the District itself and another 8% had offices in the D.C. suburbs. Thus, as we might have expected, 16 To create a systematic and replicable data set, we relied solely on publicly available information concerning lawyers' organizational affiliations and did not supplement it with data gathered from interviews. It would have been impractical to interview all 1,300 lawyers whose institutional affiliations are analyzed here. lawyers who are more broadly affiliated with these organizations tend to congregate at the seat of government. Most of the elites, even on the conservative side of the spectrum, reside within the Beltway.
We have analyzed the similarities in the patterns of organizational affiliation of the 54 lawyers who were active in three or more organizations. We also did an analysis, not presented here, that included the 127 lawyers active in two or more. The structure of the relationships in the two analyses is quite similar, but the analysis using cases with two or more connections suffers from a "sparse data" problem. That is, because there are fewer overlapping affiliations per capita, the solution (the representation of the relationships) is less stable. We make no assumption that the 54 lawyers with three or more affiliations are, in any sense, the most influential players or even necessarily the most active. It is entirely possible that one might optimize influence by concentrating one's effort on a single subject and a single organization rather than by spreading it across several, and a lawyer who works full time on one cause may well devote more time and commitment than a free agent who approaches the matters ad hoc.
We approached this analysis by constructing a matrix in which each lawyer was recorded as either active or not active in each organization. Since most lawyers were not involved in most organizations, however, we are not primarily concerned with noting where they were inactive. It is their activity, not their inactivity, that interests us. Therefore, in analyzing the matrix, we have used a measure that ignores similarity between lawyers that is attributable solely to their joint inactivity.18 Using this measure, we summarized the data through multidimensional scaling (MDS), which produced a graphic representation (Figure 1) . In this figure, 18 That is, in this matrix there will be a great predominance of zeros-each indicating that, in a given organization, a particular lawyer was inactive-and there is therefore a much greater probability that two lawyers will be similar (i.e., will match in the matrix) because they were both inactive in an organization (i.e., both have zeros) than that they will match because they were active in both. Therefore, we have used a measure of similarity known as the Jaccard measure. In a four-cell table, where the "a" cell represents cases in which both of two actors are present, "b" represents cases in which one is present but the other is absent, "c" represents cases in which the second party is present but the first is absent, and "d" represents cases in which both are absent, the proximity measure a/(a+b+c) ignores congruence or similarity that is attributable simply to the absence of both parties. That is, the measure is the number of instances ofjoint activation of two actors (i.e., the presence of both) divided by the total of the three types of activation, joint and several. Thus, an actor has an instance of joint activation with every other actor who is active in the same organization. If two actors, each of whom is active in three organizations, are active in the same three, then the measure will be 3 divided by 3+0+0= 1. If these two actors overlap in only one of their organizational affiliations, the measure will be 1 divided by 1 + + 2 = 0.20. For all pairs of actors where there is no overlap (i.e., no joint affiliation), the measure will be zero divided by some number greater than zero (the total number of organizational affiliations of the two actors) = zero. Thus, the measure of proximity ranges between 1 (a perfect match) and zero (no match). among each pair of lawyers, simultaneously considered, is a rather tall statistical order. Here, since there are 54 lawyers, there are 2,862 pairs. The challenge is to describe, accurately, the distance (i.e., similarity) between lawyer A and lawyer B, while also giving an accurate depiction of the distance between A and C, B and C, A and D, and 2,858 other pairs. Such a representation can be done perfectly in a solution with one less dimension than the number of cases being analyzed. That is, here we could obtain a perfect representation of all the relationships among 54 lawyers in a solution with 53 dimensions, but we fear that such a space would be difficult to comprehend. If the structure of relationships among the lawyers' constituencies is highly systematic, however (perhaps principally determined by two or three major variables that separate them into categories), we may be able to get a satisfactory representation (i.e., a solution with an acceptable level of distortion or "stress" in the depiction of the relationships) in only two or three dimensions (or possibly even one). The number of dimensions required to depict the relationships within an acceptable limit of stress is, then, an indication of the simplicity or complexity of the structure of relationships.
The solution presented in Figure 1 has a very low level of stress in two dimensions (.04), and a solution with only one dimension would, in fact, fit the data quite well (.08 stress). The conventional standards for levels of stress suggest that values below .10 are excellent and those above .20 are unacceptable (Kruskal & Wish 1978) . Thus, these relationships appear to be highly structured by some organizing principle. In Figure 1 , however, we nonetheless choose to present the two-dimensional solution because we believe that the additional dimension adds nuance that is of interest, which will be discussed next.
To understand the structure of this space, it is necessary to know which organizations the lawyers work with and, perhaps, the issue agendas of those organizations. The labels placed on particular regions of the space are intended to reflect the characteristics of the organizational constituencies concentrated within those regions. The ellipses or boundary lines drawn in the figure were not derived through computation, but are interpretive and are intended to facilitate our discussion of the structure of the space. We have attached to the article, as Appendix C, a list of the organizational affiliations of the 54 lawyers analyzed in Figure 1 , but we will not try to touch on all of those affiliations in this text. Rather, we will give illustrative examples and note general categories of organizations. The reader can evaluate our generalizations by consulting the appendix.
There are two primary clusters of lawyers in Figure 1 , one at the lower right and one on the lower left. The group at the right is entirely composed of lawyers working for business organizations. over domestic and foreign policy issues."30 The combination of the moral emphasis, which appeals to the religious conservatives, and the "limited government" values, which appeal to the business constituency, place it between the two factions, with ties to both. Meese and Warren also had direct ties to the Chamber of Commerce. In addition, the Center for Individual Rights, the Heritage Foundation, Empower America, Citizens for a Sound Economy, and the Southeastern Legal Foundation were served by one or more of these four lawyers.
Thus, the structure is clearly divided in the horizontal dimension between business conservatives on one side of the space and religious conservatives on the other. The relatively few lawyers who have ties in both of these constituencies are found closer to the center of the structure. Note that the maximum distance occurs between the core business constituency and the abortion constituency. Because the order of the points along the horizontal dimension, alone, fits the data adequately, we will not give much emphasis to the vertical dimension of the space.
We have chosen to present the two-dimensional solution, however, to make clear the separation between the libertarian and the "family values" constituencies. If the points were all arrayed along one line, those groups would appear to be more proximate. Although the one-dimensional solution satisfies conventional criteria for "fit," it fails to capture the social reality that the libertarian and family values constituencies are, in fact, quite separate. The vertical dimension also discloses the separation between the Catholic (abortion) and the evangelical Christian constituencies.
We 33 There are at least two senses in which the term "broker" is commonly used. One is the "honest broker," i.e., a relatively disinterested intermediary. This is the sense Charles Horsky had in mind when he described the Washington lawyer as "principal interpreter between government and private person, explaining to each the needs, desires, and demands of the other" (1952:10). The other sense is the "power broker," a lawyer of the Since we do not have data on the nature of the information flow in the network considered here, we cannot definitively characterize its type. But the fact that there are some centrally located actors suggests that this is not a network in which the communication occurs only around the periphery of a circle or the surface of a hollow sphere. Moreover, the division of the interest groups into quite distinct clusters, well separated by both social and geographic distance, suggests that the actors are probably not densely connected to each other. If the network is of the hierarchical type, however, that does not guarantee that the central actors will in fact function as mediators or unaligned brokers. Because central positions in such a network are empowering, persons who occupy those positions will acquire significant value in the market for services. The special power they have is an asset and competing players may be expected to bid to acquire that asset. Classical theory tells us that the rarer the asset is and the greater the demand for it, the higher the price will be. Lawyers, consultants, and politicians ordinarily participate in these markets. At some price, agents who are in the market will make their services available to one of the bidders. When they do, they become aligned (or acquired) and thus are no longer able to function as independent mediators. For that reason, a political structure with truly unaligned brokers will tend to be an unstable equilibrium in a free market for services (Heinz et al. 1993:307) . In the present case, of the six lawyers located in the central region of Figure 1 , only Bennett is not affiliated with a business clientele. Cooper, Warren, and Olson (at the relevant time) were all in private law firms and represented corporate clients. Meese was on the board of the litigation group of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. McConnell was affiliated with the American Insurance Association; he also had extensive ties to Christian groups, but was the only one of the six central actors who had direct ties to the religious groups, so far as we could determine. Thus, there is at least the distinct possibility that the central region of the space, which we have labeled "mediators," has a pronounced tilt toward the business side of the network.
VI. Conclusion
As the reader may be well aware, there is a certain tension in this article-it has some difficulty deciding whether its subject is lawyers and their activities, affiliations, and backgrounds, or, Clark Clifford model. Both have the potential to shape political decisions, the one by providing information and communication linkage, the other by access to money, officeholders, or votes. It is not at all clear that one type is necessarily more influential than the other (Heinz et al. 1993:3-7) . instead, the structure of relationships among conservative organizations. The article deals with both, but which of these subjects is primary depends on whether one believes that the lawyers have distinctive influence on the nature of the organizational relationships. If they do, then the story of the relationships is also a story about the power that lawyers qua lawyers possess to shape the political process. If, however, the linkages among organizations provided by lawyers duplicate those created by others, the story is primarily about the organizations and the affinities and aversions among them. The issue, then, is lawyer exceptionalism. Do lawyers have a special office, a distinctive set of skills, credentials, contacts, or other attributes that serve to create links among these organizations where none would otherwise exist? Although we offer some evidence that is relevant to this question, we cannot provide a definite answer because we lack comparative data. We do not know, for example, what the structure of relationships among the organizations would look like if the connections considered were those provided by lobbyists or by interlocking directorates.34
The issue of lawyer exceptionalism has previously been addressed in other contexts. Political scientists sought to determine whether lawyers who were elected to legislatures behaved differently than other legislators, and concluded that they did not (Derge 1959 (Derge , 1962 Note, however, that we found clear divisions among these constituencies and distinct separation of their issue agendas. There was no overlap between organizations active on the flag burning and English language issues and organizations active on any other issue in the set of 17. On flag burning, the organizations identified in our search of news stories were the American Legion, the Citizens' Flag Alliance, the Elks, and the Moose. On the English language issue, the only organization identified was U.S. English. Thus, the NAM, Chamber of Commerce, Christian Legal Society, Center for Individual Rights, Cato Institute, Heritage Foundation, and other major players in the conservative movement did not, so far as we could determine, choose to become prominent in these issues. Similarly, the gun locks and crime bill issues involved only a small set of organizations. The National Rifle Association was active on both, the Izaak Walton League lobbied on gun locks, and the National Victims Center spoke on the crime bill. None of those organizations was active on any other issue in the set, and none of the major players in the conservative establishment chose to take a prominent role in those issues. The abortion issue also had a distinct and insular constituency. Of the broad-based conservative organizations, only Empower America is found among the 18 organizations active on abortion. None of the business organizations-none of the organizations involved in the minimum wage, for example-was also active on abortion.47 When social conservatives seek to regulate personal behavior or impose cultural conformity (as in abortion, flag desecration, or official English) those positions do not fit comfortably with advocacy of limited government. Thus, organizations committed to libertarian values will seldom be willing to strike deals in which pledges of mutual support are exchanged with groups supporting the imposition of a moral code or limits on personal freedom. Moreover, even organizations that advocate strengthening "traditional values," such as Focus on the Family, do not appear to be motivated to take an active role in proposals concerning flag desecration or official English, although one might think that they would be more comfortable with a governmental role in reinforcing values that they consider important. None of the many Christian organizations in our sample was found in the media coverage of gun locks, flag desecration, official English, or the exclusionary rule. Thus, it may be that organizations that define themselves in terms of the sanctity of innocent life, the threat of moral degeneracy, or "the traditional family unit and the Judeo- 47 Organizations on the left also may find it difficult to cooperate to achieve public policy goals, but we are aware of no empirical research exploring that issue. See Hojnacki (1997), observing that there has been almost no research about interest groups' relations with one another or their decisions whether to form alliances or work alone.
Christian value system on which it is built" (Family Research Council 2000) will be so devoted to the cause that concerns them that they will have little time or interest to invest in other issues. They may have no difficulty in forming an electoral alliance with other conservatives when presented with a dichotomous choice between an Al Gore and a George W. Bush, but the pursuit of legislative issues day-to-day, week-to-week, and month-to-month is a demanding and ambiguous enterprise. Legislative success often requires compromise. When ideological commitment is strong and pure, pragmatism may not be highly valued. As Salisbury and Conklin have observed:
At the core of expressive political action is the idea that political success is not a necessary condition. It is the moral declaration itself that is the essential justification of the effort and making the effort creates its own reward. (1998:286-87) Near the outset of this article, we suggested some reasons why lawyers might share a community of interest that would be a basis for cooperation, trust, and exchange among them, and thus perhaps for the formation of linkages among the organizations with which they are affiliated. We speculated that these lawyers might have had "similar educational experiences (perhaps at a limited set of schools)," might defer to fellow members of the bar or perhaps be brought together by bar associations, and might hold common "understandings about the legitimate processes of government." But that is not what we found. Instead, as indicated in Table 3 The fact that one does not choose to allocate one's scarce resources to a particular matter does not mean that one is hostile to that initiative. In interviews with some of these lawyers, however, we found considerable antipathy between the core constituencies. An attorney who worked on religious liberty matters described his contempt for law school classmates whose "big ambition was to work for a large, smelly corporate 'big dog' law firm in downtown Chicago and commute from their nice home."49 A lawyer who had been a partner in a prominent corporate firm before abandoning that position to devote himself full-time to Christian legal work noted that he had become increasingly uncomfortable in a law firm culture that worshiped "two false gods-personal autonomy and wealth."50 By his own account, his partners were equally uncomfortable with him; he could see that they viewed him as "one of those wild-eyed evangelicals." Eventually his partners confronted him and asked him to stop handling anti-abortion matters pro bono.51 Similarly, a corporate lawyer said that "the religious right ... makes my skin crawl."52 Several libertarian lawyers observed that monthly meetings at the Heritage Foundation often generated heated exchanges between socially conservative and libertarian lawyers. We conclude that the lawyers who serve the two core constituencies within the American conservative movement inhabit separate social worlds. For the most part, they identify with the views of their clients. When those views conflict, the lawyers are, perhaps, no more likely to forge consensus than are other interested parties. 
